This paper studies the e¤ect of labor market reform, in the form of reductions in …ring costs and unemployment bene…ts, on in ‡ation volatility. We build a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market, and estimate it with Euro Area data. Qualitatively, changes in labor market policies alter the transmission of shocks to in ‡ation, by a¤ecting the response of the three components (hiring costs, …ring costs and wage costs) of real marginal costs. Quantitatively, we …nd however that neither policy is likely to have an important e¤ect on in ‡ation volatility, due to the small impact of changes in the volatility of the labor market on in ‡ation dynamics.
Introduction
Policies aimed at regulating the labor market a¤ect the incentives that lead workers and …rms to form and keep employment relationships, thereby in ‡uencing the pro…t-maximizing behavior of …rms. In particular, changes in labor market policies may a¤ect the extent to which …rms adjust their nominal prices in order to accommodate changes in cost and demand conditions, and hence the response of the overall price level as the economy is hit by shocks. The view that labor market policies have an e¤ect on price dynamics is also held in policy circles. To take an in ‡uential example, Jean Claude Trichet, current president of the European Central Bank (ECB), has emphasized that structural reforms in the labor market may support stable in ‡ation in the Euro Area: "the implementation of the reforms in the Lisbon agenda, by easing labor and product market rigidities, . . . , will also improve the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy by facilitating price stability." 1 Despite the importance of this topic for policy-makers, surprisingly little academic work has focused on the e¤ect of labor market reform on price stability. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the topic by studying how changes in unemployment bene…ts (UB) and …ring costs (FC) may in ‡uence the volatility of in ‡ation, conditional on a given monetary policy rule. We focus on UB and FC because they are generally considered as important contributors to the rigidity of continental European labor markets. 2 Therefore, a structural reform aimed at increasing the ‡exibility of the labor market would certainly involve modi…cations in the levels of these two labor market policies.
In order to investigate this topic we set up a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . In this framework, monopolistically competitive …rms set their nominal prices in a staggered fashion. They resort both to job creation and job destruction in order to optimally adjust the size of their workforce. On the job creation side, …rms post vacancies and wait for these to be …lled. On the job destruction side, …rms destroy those jobs that become unpro…table and pay …ring costs for each job destroyed. On the other side of the labor market, unemployed workers search for jobs and receive unemployment bene…ts in the meanwhile. Finally, vacancies and unemployed workers meet in the so-called matching function. This framework therefore provides a comprehensive treatment of the interaction between labor market policies, macroeconomic shocks and pricing decisions.
The mechanism by which unemployment bene…ts and …ring costs a¤ect the transmission of shocks to in ‡ation volatility is the following. In this model, hiring and …ring is costly. As a result, hiring and …ring costs become part of …rms'real marginal costs and therefore a¤ect in ‡ation dynamics. A reduction in unemployment bene…ts reduces workers'outside option and thus increases the joint surplus of employment relationships. Since …rms receive a constant fraction of the joint surplus, vacancy posting increases. This makes the labor market tighter, which in turn makes it more costly for …rms to hire workers. In response to shocks, the hiring component of real marginal costs experiences larger ‡uctuations, and in ‡ation becomes more volatile. On the other hand, a reduction in …ring costs automatically reduces the size of ‡uctuations in the …ring component of real marginal costs. As a result, in ‡ation becomes less volatile.
In order to assess the quantitative importance of this mechanism, we parameterize our model economy to Euro Area data, using a mixed method of calibration and maximum likelihood estimation. After showing that our model economy …ts Euro Area data reasonably well, we simulate the e¤ects of hypothetical reductions in UB and FC on in ‡ation volatility. Our baseline results suggest that these labor market reforms would have very small e¤ects on in ‡ation volatility. In particular, reducing the replacement ratio of UB by 10 percentage points would increase the annualized standard deviation of in ‡ation by 5 basis points (from 0.85% to 0.90%), whereas reducing …ring costs as a fraction of the average wage by 10 percentage points would reduce in ‡ation volatility by 1 basis point (from 0.85% to 0.84%). We then test the robustness of our result to alternative model parameterizations. We …nd in all cases small e¤ects of labor market reform on in ‡ation volatility.
In the case of FC, the fall in the standard deviation of in ‡ation remains negligible (of up to 2 basis points), whereas in the case of UB the increase in our measure of in ‡ation volatility never reaches 20 basis points. The explanation for our results is the following. In the case of FC, job destruction rates barely ‡uctuate in our estimated model, such that the contribution of the …ring component of marginal costs to in ‡ation dynamics is very small. As a result, changes in FC have almost no e¤ect on in ‡ation volatility. In the case of UB, the data favors model parameterizations in which hiring costs are small, which is necessary in order to match observed employment ‡uctuations. This implies that changes in UB, and the resulting changes in the volatility of hiring costs, have small e¤ects on in ‡ation volatility.
Our analysis is closely related to earlier work by Zanetti (2007) and Campolmi and Faia (2006) . Zanetti (2007) sets up a New Keynesian model with labor market search to study how changes in unemployment bene…ts and …ring costs a¤ect aggregate ‡uctuations. After calibrating his model to UK data, he …nds that an increase in unemployment bene…ts reduces the volatility of in ‡ation, while an increase in …ring costs makes in ‡ation more volatile, which is consistent with our results.
Campolmi and Faia (2006) build a two-country model of a currency union characterized by labor market frictions and nominal price rigidities, and use it to show that in ‡ation di¤erentials in the Euro Area can be explained by di¤erences in unemployment bene…ts. They …nd in particular that in ‡ation volatility is decreasing in unemployment bene…ts, consistent again with our results. We di¤er from these two papers in that we estimate a number of key parameters that determine the transmission of shocks to in ‡ation, such as the size and persistence of shocks, the duration of price contracts and the response of monetary policy to the state of the economy. In our view, this approach provides a more reliable assessment of the quantitative consequences of changes in labor market policies on in ‡ation dynamics. Relative to Campolmi and Faia (2006) , we also analyze the e¤ect of changes in …ring costs.
In a broader perspective, our paper is related to previous research that analyzes the e¤ect of search frictions in the labor market on in ‡ation dynamics. In particular, Krause, Lopez-Salido and Lubik (2007) use US data on in ‡ation, unit labor costs and several indicators of labor market activity in order to estimate the New Keynesian Phillips curve that arises in models with search frictions. 3 In such models, the cost of hiring workers adds to the usual wage costs as a determinant of marginal costs. Our model features a similar expression for marginal costs, with the addition of a …ring cost component. Krause, Lopez-Salido and Lubik (2007) …nd that hiring costs have a small contribution to real marginal costs and hence to in ‡ation, which points in the same direction as our results for the Euro Area. 4 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 parameterizes the model to Euro Area data, using both calibration and maximum likelihood estimation, assesses the model's ability to match second moments in the data and analyzes the economy's response to di¤erent shocks. Section 4 presents our baseline results regarding the e¤ect of labor market reform on price stability and performs robustness exercises. Section 5 concludes.
Model
We now present a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions and endogenous job destruction a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994 (2007) . We depart from these studies however in the timing of hiring: rather than assuming that hiring takes place with a lag, we assume that workers hired in a certain period start producing in the same period, as in Blanchard and Gali (2006) and Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2007) . The reason is twofold. First, we believe the time-to-hire assumption is reasonable in a model with a monthly frequency, but it may be less plausible in a model with a quarterly frequency. 5 Since our model is estimated to quarterly Euro Area data, we opt for the instantaneous-hiring assumption. Second, as shown in , time-to-hire makes job destruction too volatile and job creation not volatile enough in response to shocks. 6 The model economy is populated by four types of agents: households, …rms, a …scal authority and a monetary authority. Households consist of a large number of members, a fraction of which are unemployed and search for jobs. On the other side of the labor market, …rms post a number of vacancies. Unemployed workers and vacancies, which we denote by u t and v t respectively, meet in the so-called matching function, m(v t ; u t ). Normalizing the size of the labor force to 1, u t also represents the unemployment rate. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale in the matching function, the matching probability of unemployed workers,
and vacancies,
are functions of the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers, also called labor market tightness.
From now onwards, we denote labor market tightness by t v t =u t . Notice that p ( t ) = t q ( t ).
We now describe the behavior of each type of agent.
Firms
There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms indexed on the unit interval. Inside each …rm, the timing of hiring and …ring proceeds as follows. At the beginning of each period, and after observing the aggregate shock, each …rm i 2 [0; 1] posts a number v it of vacancies. Firms are assumed to be large, such that the fraction of vacancies …lled by the …rm is given by q( t ). Once the hiring round has taken place, both newly-hired and continuing workers receive an iid idiosyncratic productivity shock, z. The latter is lognormally distributed with cdf G(z) and pdf g(z). Those workers whose idiosyncratic productivity falls below a certain reservation productivity z R it (to be determined later) become unpro…table and their jobs are destroyed, whereas the remaining workers start producing in period t according to their respective idiosyncratic productivity. Finally, at the end of the period a fraction of x workers are exogenously separated from the …rm. The law of motion of employment in …rm i is given by
where G(z R it ) is the fraction of new and continuing workers that are endogenously separated from the …rm. Therefore, the mass of jobs destroyed in the …rm is given by G(z R it )
. The …rm's production function is given by
where A t is a common productivity shock with law of motion log A t = A log A t 1 + " A t , " A t iid(0; A ).
Cost minimization
Subject to equations (1) and (2), the …rm minimizes its production costs,
where and s;t t s cs ct are respectively the subjective discount factor and the stochastic discount factor between any two periods s and t (s < t), w it (z) is the real wage paid to the worker with productivity z (to be determined later), > 0 is the real cost of posting a vacancy and F is the real …ring cost paid by the …rm for each endogenous separation. Let it and ' it denote the Lagrange multipliers associated to equations (1) and (2), respectively. it therefore represents the marginal value of employment, and ' it the real marginal cost. The …rst order conditions with respect to v it , n it and z R it are given respectively by
Using equations (3) and (5), we can rewrite equation (4) as
which states that the marginal cost of hiring new workers, =q( t ), equals the marginal bene…t of doing so. Since the worker with productivity z R it contributes nothing to the …rm (by virtue of equation 5), the value of new hires can be expressed relative to the value of the worker with productivity z R it . Similarly, using equation (3) we can express equation (5) as
Pricing decision
Due to imperfect substitutability between individual consumption goods, each …rm faces the following demand curve for its product,
where P it is the …rm's price, P t is the overall price level, t > 1 is the time-varying elasticity of substitution between individual goods in households' consumption basket and y t is aggregate demand. As is standard in the New Keynesian literature, we assume staggered price adjustment a la Calvo (1983) . Let denote the probability of changing price common to all …rms. A price-setting …rm maximizes
with respect to P it . The …rst order condition is given by
where P it is the optimal price decision and t t t 1 is the mark-up shock. We assume the log of the latter follows an autoregressive process: log t = (1 ) log 1 + log t 1 + " t , where is the steady-state value of t and " t iid(0; ).
Households
There exists a large, representative household. A fraction n t of its members are employed. The remaining members are engaged in home production, receive unemployment bene…ts and search for jobs. All members pool their resources so as to ensure equal consumption. 7 The household consumes the following basket of di¤erentiated goods,
Cost-minimization by the household implies that nominal consumption expenditure equals P t c t , where
is the overall price index. The household maximizes utility from consumption,
subject to the following period budget constraint,
where B t 1 are holdings of one-period nominal bonds purchased in t 1, i t 1 is the nominal interest rate paid on such bonds, w
dz is the steady-state average real wage, B is the replacement ratio of unemployment bene…ts, t are real pro…ts reverted from the …rm sector to households in a lump-sum manner and t are real lump-sum taxes. The …rst order conditions with respect to B t and c t can be combined into the following consumption Euler equation,
Wage bargaining
Each …rm negotiates wages with its employees on a period-by-period basis. As is standard in the search and matching literature, we assume Nash wage bargaining, which implies that the …rm and each worker split the joint surplus of their employment relationship. The joint surplus is the sum of the …rm's surplus and the worker's surplus. The worker with idiosyncratic productivity z enjoys the following surplus,
where
is the outside option of the worker. The latter is the sum of home production, h, unemployment bene…ts, R w, and the value of searching for other jobs, where p( t+1 )v jt+1 =v t+1 is the probability of being matched to …rm i in period t + 1. 8 The value that the …rm derives from the worker with idiosyncratic productivity z is given by
The worker's contribution to current pro…ts is given by the amount of product produced by the worker, A t z, times the real marginal cost of production, ' it . Given that the …rm must always meet its demand, should the worker leave the …rm the latter would have to make up for the lost production, which comes at the cost ' it . The continuation value in equation (11) is obtained as follows. Provided the worker is not exogenously separated (which happens with probability 1 x ), she draws a new idiosyncratic productivity in the following period. If x z R it+1 , the worker contributes J it+1 (x); otherwise, the job is destroyed and the …rm must pay …ring costs, F . Since the outside option for the …rm is …ring the worker and paying the …ring cost, the …rm's surplus is given by J it (z) ( F ) = J it (z) + F . 9 Let 2 (0; 1) denote the …rm's bargaining power. Nash bargaining implies the following surplussharing rule,
Combining the latter equation with the expressions for J it (z), S w it (z) and w t , we obtain the following solution for the real wage,
where x t;t+1 t;t+1 (1 x ). The worker therefore receives a weighted average of her outside option, w t , and the sum of her contribution to current pro…ts and a …ring-cost component. Firing costs a¤ect wage payments in the following way: the …rm rewards the worker for the saving in …ring costs today, but penalizes her for the fact it will have to pay …ring costs tomorrow in the worst-case scenario.
The term w t and thus the real wage equation can be further simpli…ed in the following way.
Notice …rst that equations (3), (4) and (11) imply that the total surplus enjoyed by the …rm from its workers can be written as Z
Using this and the fact that the surplus-sharing rule holds in every period, we can write
Combining this with the de…nition of w t and the real wage equation, we can …nally write the latter as
9 See e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) .
Fiscal and monetary policy
Assume for simplicity that …ring costs revert to the government. The …scal authority is assumed to adjust lump-sum taxes t so as to balance its budget in every period,
where g t is exogenous government expenditure, with law of motion log(g t ) = g log(g t ) + " g t , "
g t iid(0; g ), and t is lump-sum taxation. On the other hand, the monetary authority sets interest rates according to a forward-looking Taylor-type rule,
where E t log P t+1 Pt represents the target for the nominal interest rate, i is the degree of interest rate smoothing and " m t iid(0; m ).
Equilibrium
We are now ready to characterize the economy's equilibrium. At this point we guess that all …rms face the same real marginal cost, ' it = ' t , and choose the same reservation productivity, z R it = z R t . Equation (12) implies that w t (z) w t (z R t ) = (1 )' t A t z z R t . This allows us to write equation (6) as
Evaluating the real wage function at z R t and using the resulting expression in equation (7), we can write the latter as
Equations (14) and (15) jointly determine the …rm's real marginal cost, ' t , and reservation productivity, z R t . Since all other variables in these two equations are common to all …rms, our previous guess is veri…ed. A common real marginal cost also implies that all price-setters make the same price decision, that is, P it = P t in equation (9) . The law of motion of aggregate employment is given by
where the stock of job-seekers at the start of the period evolves according to
Vacancies are given by
Aggregate demand is given by
Equations (2) and (8) imply that, for each …rm, supply must meet demand, that is,
Integrating this condition across all …rms yields the following,
where t R 1 0 (P it =P t ) t di is a measure of price dispersion with following law of motion 10
Finally, the price level evolves according to
Equilibrium in this economy is de…ned as the path i t ; c t ; y t ; n t ; u t ; t ; z R t ; t ; ' t ; v t ; P t ; P t 1 t=0 that satis…es equations (9) (without i subscripts), (10) and (13) to (22) for all t 0, given the evolution of the exogenous shocks, flog (A t ) ; log (g t ) ; log ( t ) ; " m t g 1 t=0 , and the initial values of the endogenous state variables, fi 1 ; n 1 ; 1 ; P 1 g. For future reference, we also de…ne after-hiring unemployment,
which is the fraction of the labor force that is left without a job after hiring has taken place in period t.
Model parameterization and assessment
The model is partly calibrated and partly estimated to quarterly Euro Area data. Our strategy consists of calibrating those parameters that a¤ect the steady state and estimating the remaining parameters. We discuss …rst our calibration.
1 0 See e.g. Yun (1996).
Calibration
As is common in real business cycle studies, we set the quarterly discount rate to = 0:99. Following
Blanchard and Gali (2006), we set the steady-state after-hiring unemployment rate U to 0.10 and the steady-state quarterly job …nding rate p( ) to 0.25. The employment rate and the stock of job-seekers in the steady state are then given by n = 1 U = 0:90 and u = 1 (1 x )n = 0:11, respectively. Equations (16) and (17) imply that, in the steady state, the following condition must hold,
where n G(z R ) and x + (1 x ) n are respectively the endogenous and the total separation rate in the steady state. The values of n estimated for the US are typically centered around one half of the total separation rate. 11 Lacking similar evidence for the euro area, we assume n = =2.
Using this in equation (23), and given our values of p( ) and n, we obtain = 0:0312, which implies n = 0:0156 and The parameters controlling labor market reform are calibrated as follows. In our model, F is the part of the total cost of …ring a worker that does not represent a transfer from the …rm to the worker. Given the lack of a reliable estimate of this cost for the euro area as a whole, we set it to 20%
of the quarterly average real wage. Expressing …ring costs as F = F w, we thus assume F = 0:20.
According to Nickell and Nunziata (2007) , average replacement ratios in the four largest euro area members in the period 1998 to 2004 (i.e., roughly our estimation sample) range from 39% (Spain) to 58% (Germany). Given that such bene…ts accrue inde…nitely to unemployed workers in our model but have a limited duration in actual legislations, we set the common euro area replacement ratio to B = 0:40.
The idiosyncratic productivity shock z is lognormally distributed: log(z) N ( z ; z ). Following standard practice in the literature, we normalize z to 0. Regarding z , lacking direct evidence on this parameter we adopt the following procedure. Given the values of z , z and n , the reservation productivity equals z R = G 1 ( n ), where G( ) is the cdf of the lognormal distribution. In the steady state, equations (14) and (15) and the cross-sectional average of equation (12) form the following 3-equation system, 12
which can be used to solve for home production, h, the cost of posting a vacancy, , and the average real wage, w. For values of z lower than 0.18, the latter three equations imply negative values for , which violates the non-negativity constraint on this parameter. 
Estimation
We estimate the remaining structural parameters ( A ; g ; ; m ; A ; g ; ; ; i ; ) by maximum likelihood. 13 In order to match the number of shocks in our model, we choose four observable variables: real output (y t ), employment (n t ), year-on-year in ‡ation ( yoy t log P t log P t 4 ) and the nominal interest rate (i t ). The euro area as such exists since 1999:Q1. This leaves us with a very short sample. We follow the argument in Rabanal (2006) that by 1997 convergence in national nominal interest rates had been nearly reached. We therefore use data from 1997:Q1 to 2007:Q4, which gives us 44 observations. 14 Employment and real GDP are logged and linearly detrended, whereas in ‡ation and nominal interest rates are demeaned. For the purpose of illustration, in Figure   1 we plot the detrended series of employment and real GDP in our sample. The correlation between output and employment is strongly positive, with output leading employment by one quarter. 15 1 2 We are normalizing the steady-state exogenous productivity shock, A, to 1. 1 3 The estimation and all the subsequent simulations are performed using a log-linear approximation of the model around a zero-in ‡ation steady state. We use the software DYNARE in all our exercises. 1 4 Our data is obtained from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. Our series are GDP at constant prices, total domestic employment, the GDP de ‡ator and the 3-month Euribor. All series are seasonally adjusted. We also estimated the model using the rate of change of the Harmonized CPI as our measure of in ‡ation (the CPI and the GDP de ‡ator are equivalent in our model). We found the estimation results to be nearly identical. 1 5 Sample correlations between employment and the k-th lag of output are 0.95 (k = 2), 0.96 (k = 1), 0.93 (k = 0) and 0.86 (k = 1). estimates are fairly precise, with the exception of the standard error of the government shock ( g ), and to a lesser extent the coe¢ cient on expected in ‡ation in the Taylor rule ( ). The productivity and government shocks turn out to be quite persistent, whereas the data favors a mark-up shock with no persistence. The estimated Calvo parameter implies an average duration of price contracts, 1 , of about 7 and a half quarters, i.e. almost two years. This is clearly too long in the light of micro evidence for the euro area, but is a common result in models that lack a real price rigidity mechanism. 16 Finally, we impose an upper bound of 10% on the standard deviation of each shock, which is hit by the optimization procedure in the case of . 17 
Model assessment
We next assess the estimated model's ability to match the data in our sample. Table 2 displays a variety of sample second moments from the data and theoretical second moments from the model.
Overall the …t is reasonably good. The standard deviation and …rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cients of the observable variables are approximated well. The model also captures the strong positive correlation of employment and output at leads -1, 0 and 1. The model however under-predicts the positive correlation between output and nominal interest rates at the three leads considered. 1 6 Real price rigidities arise in situations in which individual marginal cost curves are upward-sloping, which is not the case in the present framework. Such rigidities have the e¤ect of slowing price adjustment for a given average frequency of price adjustment. Equivalently, they reduce the amount of price stickiness that is needed to match in ‡ation dynamics. On this question, see Altig et al. (2004) or Woodford (2005) . 1 7 Unrestricted estimates are in general economically implausible and statistically imprecise. For instance, we obtain a point estimate and standard deviation of (4.99, 4.53) for , (0.96, 0.01) for , (37.8%, 24.2%) for g and (77.6%, 44.1%) for . We believe the improvement in the overall …t of the data does not compensate for the implausibility and imprecission of these estimates. 
Impulse-response analysis
In order to illustrate the transmission mechanism in our model, we now simulate the economy's response to shocks. Figures 2 to 4 display the response of a number of variables to a one-standarddeviation shock to productivity, government spending and the nominal interest rate, respectively.
The variance decomposition of our estimated model shows that these three shocks account for 100% of the variance of output, employment and nominal interest rates, and 60% of the variance of yearon-year in ‡ation. 18 Mark-up shocks account for the remaining 40% of in ‡ation ‡uctuations, but their lack of autocorrelation and the fact that interest rates respond to expected in ‡ation imply that such shocks have no e¤ect on any of the other variables.
Following a positive productivity shock (Figure 2 ), in ‡ation goes down and the central bank cuts nominal interest rates, which boosts consumption spending. At the same time, the increase in labor productivity leads …rms to increase the resources devoted to vacancy posting. These last two e¤ects drive aggregate demand upwards on impact. This in turn produces a somewhat slower increase in employment, which would explain why output leads employment as observed in Figure   1 . The lower right panel displays the response of job creation and job destruction. These are de…ned as
respectively, where t x + (1 x )G(z R t ) is the total separation rate. Equation (16) can then be written as n t = n t 1 + jc t jd t . As shown by the …gure, …rms resort to a combination of higher job creation and lower job destruction in order to increase employment, although most of the adjustment takes place along the job creation margin.
Following a government shock (Figure 3 ), output and employment increase. The response of both variables is almost identical, which implies that average idiosyncratic productivity z t barely changes. Once again, employment adjusts mainly along the job creation margin, thanks in particular to a large expansion of vacancy posting in the impact period. The tightening of the labor market puts upward pressure on real marginal costs. As a result, in ‡ation increases, although it does so by a very small amount. The e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate ( Figure   4 ) are very similar to those of a government shock, but with the opposite signs. Notice …nally that after-hiring unemployment (U t ) and vacancies are negatively correlated for all three shocks, with conditional correlations of -55%, -49% and -52%, respectively, and an unconditional correlation of -48%. That is, a Beveridge curve materializes.
E¤ects of labor market reform on price stability
We are ready to simulate the e¤ects on price stability of a hypothetical labor market reform in our estimated model of the euro area. At this point, we …nd it useful to take a closer look at the determinants of in ‡ation. Once the model is loglinearized, in ‡ation dynamics are described by the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve,
where (1 )(1 )= and hats denote log-deviations from steady state. In ‡ation is thus driven by real marginal costs and mark-up shocks. Equations (3) and (4) allow us to express real marginal costs as
dz are the average real wage and the average idiosyncratic productivity, respectively, and
is the endogenous job destruction rate. Since new hires have random idiosyncratic productivity, real marginal costs equals the ratio of the average increase in labor costs (the expression in square brackets) and the average increase in production (A t z t ) due to the additional hires. Labor costs are given by the cost of hiring workers,
, the cost of …ring those who fall below the reservation productivity, F n t = (1 n t ), the average wage paid to those who stay in the …rm, w t , and their continuation value for the …rm, E t x t;t+1 =q( t+1 ). Using the aggregate production function, y t = A t n t z t , we can rewrite real marginal costs as
where we have also used the fact that (1 n t ) (1 x ) = 1 t . Therefore, marginal costs are the sum of a hiring component (the expression in square brackets), a …ring component, and the labor share of GDP, n t w t =y t . We now make use of an approximation similar to the one employed by Blanchard and Gali (2006) . We start by noticing that vacancy posting costs, = 0:013, and separation rates, n = 0:016 = =2, are of the same order of magnitude as the ‡uctuations of the endogenous variables in the marginal cost expression, with the exception of t , which experiences larger ‡uctuations. 19 Once the above equation is log-linearized, all terms multiplied by , n or become second-order terms, except for those involving^ t . This yields the following …rst-order approximation of real marginal costs,
where~ n t n t n . Combining the latter equation with equation (25) …nally yields the following approximate expression for in ‡ation dynamics,
In ‡ation is (approximately) equal to the sum of a hiring component,
a …ring component,
a labor share component,
Log-linearizing equations (16) and (17) and combining the resulting expressions, we obtain the following law of motion of employment,n
where = 0:6 in our calibration. Therefore, …rst-order ‡uctuations in employment and the endogenous job destruction rate must be accompanied by …rst-order ‡uctuations in ^ t. Since is itself …rst-order,^ t must experience ‡uctuations of a larger magnitude. For instance, under our baseline calibration the standard deviation of^ t is 20.7%, versus 0.84% fornt, 1.12% forŷt and 0.05% for where covs collects the sum of all covariances between the four components of in ‡ation.
What is the e¤ect on price stability that we should expect from reductions in unemployment bene…ts and …ring costs? A reduction of unemployment bene…ts reduces the outside option of workers and thus increases the joint surplus of employment relationships. Since …rms always receive a constant fraction of the joint surplus, the bene…t of hiring increases and so does vacancy posting. As the labor market becomes tighter, the probability of …lling a vacancy falls and thus the marginal cost of hiring, =q( ), increases. As a result, in response to shocks the same percentage ‡uctuations in labor market tightness,^ t , produce greater percentage ‡uctuations in hiring costs,
This should increase the volatility of the hiring component of in ‡ation, hc t , and hence in ‡ation volatility. On the other hand, a reduction in …ring costs automatically decreases the size of ‡uctuations in the …ring component of in ‡ation (f c t ) for given ‡uctuations in job destruction rates and average labor productivity. This should make in ‡ation less volatile. Finally, to the extent that labor market reform alters the variability of real wages and labor productivity, it will also change the cyclical volatility of the labor share component, ls t . It is di¢ cult however to establish the qualitative direction of this change. Figure 5 plots the evolution of the variance of approximate in ‡ation and its components (except for the variance of the mark-up shock component, which remains constant) as we decrease the replacement ratio of unemployment bene…ts (from 40% to 30%) and …ring costs (from 20% to 10%). The plots must therefore be read from right to left. 20 In order to check the accuracy of our approximation, the solid lines display the actual variance of in ‡ation in the log-linearized economy.
In the case of a reduction in unemployment bene…ts, three results stand out. First, in ‡ation volatility increases very little: its annualized standard deviation, 4std( t ), increases from 0.85% to 0.90%.
Second, this small increase is driven almost entirely by an increase in the volatility of the labor share component, and in particular by larger ‡uctuations in the expected discounted path of average real wages. 21 Third, the contribution of the hiring component of in ‡ation is negligible in the baseline 2 0 Since mark-up shocks have no e¤ect on any endogenous variable other than quarterly in ‡ation in the log-linear approximation of the model, the covariance between the mark-up shock component and the other components of approximate in ‡ation is zero. That is, covs = 2cov(hct; f ct) + 2cov(hct; lst) + 2cov(f ct; lst): economy and remains so as unemployment bene…ts fall. Even though ‡uctuations in labor market tightness are substantial, the small value of vacancy posting costs ( = 0:013) implies that such ‡uctuations have a small e¤ect on in ‡ation.
In the case of a reduction in …ring costs, in ‡ation volatility falls, but the change is even smaller: from 0.85% to 0.84% in terms of the annualized standard deviation. The reason is that ‡uctuations in the endogenous job destruction rate,^ n t , are very small in the baseline economy (with a 0.05% standard deviation). As a result, changes in the volatility of the …ring component of in ‡ation produced by reductions in FC have negligible e¤ects on the variance of in ‡ation.
Robustness analysis
As we discussed in section 3, we calibrated and estimated our model under four di¤erent values of the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks (0.20, 0.30, 0.40 and 0.50) and found that the model's …t of the data was best for z = 0:20. In fact, the likelihood function evaluated at the estimated parameters decreases monotonically as we increase z . A feature of our baseline calibration is that the value of vacancy posting costs consistent with the steady state of the model is very small, such that hiring costs play almost no role in in ‡ation dynamics. As z increases and the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity shocks becomes more spread out, the distance between the average and the reservation productivity increases, which from equation (24) increases the marginal bene…t of hiring in the steady state. As a result, the value of consistent with the steady state of the model increases, and with it the relevance of hiring costs for in ‡ation volatility. For this reason, we now simulate the e¤ect of labor market reform on price stability under two alternative values of z : 0.30 and 0.40. 22 The results for z = 0:30 are displayed in Figure 6 . The change in in ‡ation volatility following a reduction in unemployment bene…ts is now slightly more pronounced than in our baseline parameterization: the annualized standard deviation of in ‡ation increases from 0.88% to 0.96%. The reasons is that, as vacancy posting costs become larger ( now equals 0:078), changes in the volatility of hiring costs become more relevant for in ‡ation dynamics. Indeed, most of the rise in the variance of in ‡ation is now explained by the rise in the variance of hc t and its covariance with ls t (its covariance with f c t stays nearly constant). In the case of a reduction in …ring costs, the message barely changes with respect to the baseline parameterization: in ‡ation volatility falls by a very small amount, from 0.88% to 0.86% in terms of standard deviation. The annualized standard deviation of in ‡ation rises now from 0.91% to 1.09%, and the contribution of the variance of the hiring component and its covariance with the labor share component is even more visible. Once again, a reduction in …ring costs has very little e¤ect on in ‡ation volatility, which falls from 0.91% to 0.89%.
To summarize our robustness results, increasing the variance of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks magni…es the e¤ect of reductions in unemployment bene…ts on in ‡ation volatility, due to the greater importance of hiring costs for in ‡ation dynamics. However, these results should be taken with care, because the model's …t of the data also worsens as we increase z , as indicated by the value of the likelihood function. And in any case, the e¤ects are small: the increase in the annualized standard deviation of in ‡ation following a 10 percentage point reduction in the replacement ratio is always below 20 basis points.
Conclusions
This paper has studied the e¤ects that changes in labor market policies, in the form of unemployment bene…ts and …ring costs, may have on price stability. Our analysis is based on a New Keynesian model in which the labor market is subject to search and matching frictions. We take our theoretical model to Euro Area data and provide a quantitative assessment of the potential e¤ects that labor market reform may have on price stability. We …nd that changes in unemployment bene…ts or …ring costs are unlikely to have a signi…cant impact on the volatility of in ‡ation. As far as …ring costs are concerned, job destruction rates are nearly acyclical in our estimated model, such that changes 
